









The use of set theory is a common practice in the treatment of philosophical
problems in the areas of philosophy of logic and philosophy of language, among
others. Thus, when there are difficulties in understanding concepts such as state of
affairs, propositions, truth, meaning, etc., set theoretical notions are commonly
employed in order to elucidate these concepts. Moreover, there is a feeling among
philosophers that if it is not possible to characterize a concept in this way we must
eliminate it from our theory. Without a doubt, Quine was the most important
philosopher to assume this attitude, and it is no coincidence that in a well-known
passage in chapter VII of Word and Object, when he discusses the conception of
elucidation, the example he gives is the set theoretical definition of ordered pair.
The main source of this conception of philosophical elucidation was the logicist
program1 . The impact of Russell and Frege’s conceptions on Carnap, for instance, was
decisive in his adoption of a certain way of conceiving philosophical analysis, and
until the end of his life, he defended the idea that Frege’s approach to arithmetic had
provided a satisfactory solution for a difficult philosophical problem2 . As a matter of
Dedicated to the memory of Michael Wrigley (1953 - 2003)
(1) Of course, the works of mathematicians like Zermelo, Kuratowski, von Neumann, and others, had
a great influence in the emergence of this conception. However, their ideas will not be discussed in
this paper.
(2) See, for instance, his reply to Strawson’s paper in Schilpp, p. 935.
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fact, the logicism can be seen as the main source from where Carnap derives the idea
that the proper task of philosophy is to provide explanations of concepts that can be
found in every day life or in the early stage of scientific development. It is not a
coincidence that on different occasions3  he gives as examples of this method the
Russell-Frege characterization of numbers and Tarski’s work on truth, two results
obtained within the framework of set theory.
Russell was always more concerned than Frege with the problem of
obtaining some philosophical justification for the set theoretical characterization
of arithmetic. On several occasions he considered this problem and tried to obtain
a satisfactory solution to it. Along this line, the problems that we will examine
from now on are: what argumentation does Russell use in order to justify his
conception that numbers are sets? Is it sound? What do we attain, from a
conceptual point of view, from this approach? This will be done mainly from
Russell’s argumentation presented in the first chapters of his book Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy4 .
The first thing that we must do in order to obtain satisfactory answers
to these questions is to analyze Russell’s criticism of the axiomatization of
arithmetic obtained by Peano in 1899. In the beginning of his book, in chapter one,
we find the following statement:
It is time now to turn to the considerations which make it necessary to advance beyond
the standpoint of Peano, who represents the last perfection of the “arithmetisation” of
mathematics (…) but we shall give some of the reasons why Peano’s treatment is less
final than it appears to be. (Russell, 1985, p. 7)
(3) See Meaning and Necessity, pp. 7-8 and Logical Foundations of Probability, pp. 5 and 17.
(4) I will not discuss Benacerraf’s argumentation presented in “What Number Could not Be”, because I
think that is possible to refute Russell’s position without appealing to the existence of different set
theoretical characterizations of numbers. Moreover, as Benacerraf himself has acknowledged (“What






According to Russell, Peano’s work could not be considered the last step in
the elucidation of the concept of number because there were problems in
interpreting the primitive terms in Peano’s axioms5  that could not receive a
satisfactory solution.
It is possible to conceive Peano’s basic notions (zero, number, and successor) as
either variables or constants. There are three basic problems that we have to face if
we take the first alternative. If they are variables it is possible to find an indefinite
number of interpretations satisfying the axioms. For instance, if ‘0’ has its habitual
meaning, ‘number’ means the even numbers, and ‘successor’ refers to the
operation of adding two to a given number, it is easy to see that all Peano’s
axioms are true in this interpretation. Thus, Peano’s system does not accomplish
its main task, namely its axioms do not allow us to distinguish between the series
of natural numbers and any other progression6 .
The second problem is that we do not know if the objects defined by
Peano’s axioms exist because if the primitives of the system are variables we must
assume that the set of axioms is a definition of natural numbers, and it is a well-
known fact that from a definition it does not follow that what is defined exists. In
Peano’s system even if we agree that its definition is acceptable, we do not have
any assurance that the natural numbers really exist.
(…) If we adopt this plan, our theorems will not be proved concerning an ascertained set
of terms called ‘natural numbers’, but concerning all sets of terms having certain
properties (…) But from two points of view it fails to give an adequate basis for
(5) Peano’s axiomatization has three primitive terms (0, number and successor) and five axioms: 1. 0 is
a number; 2. The successor of any number is a number; 3. No two numbers have the same successor;
4. 0 is not the successor of any number; and, 5. Any property that belongs to 0, and also to the
successor of every number which has the property, belongs to all numbers.
(6) A progression is a series that satisfies four conditions: 1. It has a first term; 2. Each member of the
series has a successor; 3. There is no member that occurs twice in the series; and, 4. Every term can be
reach from the start in a finite numbers of steps.
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arithmetic. In the first place, it does not enable us to know whether there are any sets of
terms verifying Peano’s axioms (…). (Russell, 1985, p. 10)
The last of Russell’s objections is that the task that natural numbers have to
accomplish is twofold. They have to verify the totality of the arithmetical
formulae, and they must allow us to count common objects in our daily life; in
other words, besides their theoretical function, natural numbers have a practical
one and the existence of an infinite number of interpretations of Peano’s system
would make it impossible to fix a precise meaning for numeric expressions.
(…) A system in which “1” meant 100, “2” meant 101, and so on, might be all right for
pure mathematics, but would not suit daily life (…) we want our numbers to be such as
can be used for counting common objects, and this requires that our numbers should
have a definite meaning, not merely that they should have certain formal properties (…).
(Russell, 1985, pp. 9-10)
Nevertheless, Russell attracts attention to the fact that we already have
knowledge of the meaning of primitive terms independently of Peano’s axioms,
and it is from this fact that he begins to consider the second option mentioned
above, namely the primitive terms have to be conceived as constants. From this
point of view it is quite natural to consider that these concepts are of such a nature
that no further analysis is possible. However, despite the naturalness of this
solution Russell rejects it:
(...) all that we can do, if we adopt this method, is to say “we know what we mean by ‘0’
and ‘numbers’ and ‘successor’, though we cannot explain what we mean in terms of
other simpler concepts”. It is quite legitimate to say this when me must, and at some
point we all must; but it is the object of mathematical philosophy to put off saying it as
long as possible. By the logical theory of arithmetic we are able to put it off for a very
long time (…). (Russell, 1985, p. 9)
According to Russell, Peano stopped his analysis too early, and in order to






concepts unless we are sure that these concepts cannot be analyzed into simpler
ones. Russell defends this idea with two kinds of arguments; on the one hand he
uses technical results that he has obtained during his attempt to reduce
mathematics to logic, and on the other hand he makes use of philosophical
objections to show how Peano’s account is unsatisfactory from a conceptual
point of view.
Russell, independent of Frege, discovered how it is possible to obtain set
theoretical definitions for the primitive terms of Peano’s arithmetic. Thus, he defi-
nes natural number as the posterity of 0 with respect to the relation immediate prede-
cessor; number 0 as the class that has as its only member the empty set; and defines
successor in the following way:
The successor of the number of terms in the class a is the number of terms in the class
consisting of a together with x, where x is any term not belonging to the class. (Russell,
1985, p. 23)
The next move is to prove Peano’s axioms with the assistance of these
definitions. From the definitions of number and zero Russell shows that two of
Peano’s axioms (number one and number five, see footnote 4) become true by
definition. Thus, according to him, the principle of induction is what
distinguished natural numbers from all other numerical entities:
We shall use the phrase “inductive numbers” to mean the same set as we have hitherto
spoken of as the “natural numbers”. The phrase “inductive numbers” is preferable as
affording a reminder that the definition of this set of numbers is obtained from
mathematical induction. (Russell, 1985, p. 27)
Afterward, with the definition of successor Russell proves the following two
axioms: that the successor of any number is a number, and that 0 is not the
successor of any number. However, there is a problem in proving the third axiom
because, if the number of individuals in the world is finite, it is false. The only
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solution is to assume the axiom of infinity7  that cannot receive any justification
within the framework of logicism.
In relation to the philosophical aspect of Russell’s criticism, it is not an easy
task to understand his position since his ideas are presented in a brief way. In the
end of chapter two we find the following passage:
So far we have not suggested anything in the slightest degree paradoxical. But when we
come to the actual definition of numbers we cannot avoid what must at first sight seem a
paradox, though this impression will soon wear off. We naturally think that the class of
couples (for example) is something different from the number 2. But there is no doubt
about the class of couples: it is indubitable and not difficult to define, whereas the
number 2, in any other sense, is a metaphysical entity about which we can never feel
sure that it exist or that we have tracked it down. It is therefore more prudent to content
ourselves with the class of couple, which we are sure of, than to hunt for a problematical
number 2 which must always remain elusive. (Russell 1985 p. 18)
The idea is that, at first sight, it seems to be odd to identify numbers and
sets; however the advantage of this approach is that numbers are elusive entities,
whereas classes are not. Russell’s conclusion is a little surprising: in spite of the
unnatural consequences of the identification of these two types of entities, this is
the only way to obtain a satisfactory explanation of the concept of number.
Is Russell’s point of view acceptable? Are numbers sets? Is Peano’s approach
unsatisfactory? In order to answer these questions we must analyze Russell’s
remarks and establish if the reasons he provides are enough to confirm his
conclusions.
First we must consider the case in which Peanos’s primitive terms are
conceived as variables. It is a historical fact that within the Italian school8  it was a
(7) Russell’s formulation of this can be found in chapter 13 of Introduction: if n be any inductive cardi-
nal number, there is at least one class of individuals having n terms.
(8) This school was composed by Veronese, Pieri, Burali-Forti, Betazzi, Fano, among others, and all of






common practice to adopt this approach in order to explain how an axiomatic
theory works. However, if we adopt this view on the nature of the axiom it
becomes very difficult to give an account of the several components of the
axiomatic method. For instance, if the primitive terms are variables until we
interpreted them the axioms are neither true nor false, because, according to this
view, they are not propositions but propositional functions. But, from this
perspective, for instance, how do we understand the concept of proof? A proof is a
procedure that allows us to establish the truth of a theorem from the truth of the
axioms. With this new approach it becomes impossible to maintain that one of the
most important tasks of a proof is to produce knowledge and justification, since
the notion of truth has disappeared from the basis of the theory.
A possible solution is to use the concept of interpretation, but then the
problem indicated earlier by Russell appears again: which interpretation is the
right one? It is important to bear in mind that if we interpret Peano’s primitive as
variables what we are doing is to move to another level and, in this way, we are
no longer dealing with natural numbers, but with sequences in general. By the
way, Hilbert’s system of geometry had the same problem and Frege saw it clearly;
when Hilbert says that his axioms are definitions of the primitive terms he is
changing the level and working with a second-order geometry. In this case the
interpretations are instantiations of more general concepts and not definitions of
the primitive terms. Then, what is important to see is that the objection Russell
raises is not concerned with the nature of the natural number concept, but one that
involves the problem of how to understand the nature of primitive terms in an
axiomatic theory. Russell is right in defending the idea that to take the axioms as
definitions is not the right way of interpreting Peano’s work, but this does not
imply that we must reduce numbers to a more primitive entities; the only
conclusion that we get from this fact is that we have to conceive the axioms in
another way.
The second objection Russell raises is that if we treat the primitive terms as
variables we will never be sure that what they define exists. This is a serious
problem only if we think that what is prior is the theory and not the domain that is
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described by it. If we adopt Aristotle’s idea and take axioms as fundamental
truths that describe a specific domain, what we have to do is to assume the
existence of some entities. From this perspective, Peano’s axiomatization has the
same problem that any axiomatization has, namely it cannot assure the existence
of everything, some entities must be assumed from the beginning. Of course then
a new problem arises: how do we know what entities must be assumed? Again,
what is important to understand here is that this problem shows that a certain way
to look at the axiomatic method is not correct; this has no relation with Peano’s
approach that assumes that the concept of number is a primitive one.
The idea according to which natural numbers, besides satisfying the
arithmetical formulae, must allow us to use them in our daily life, is a correct one.
The problem, again, is to understand what the role-played by axiomatization is in
this context. If we demand that Peano’s axiomatization gives the meaning of
number words we, again, must face the objection of multiples interpretation; but
if we assume that Peano’s axioms reflect the main features of a concept that goes
before the axiomatization, then there is no problem; it would be odd to assume
that before Peano’s work nobody knew how to count! People have informal
knowledge of arithmetical notions and any systematization must be in accordance
with them, otherwise we always can affirm that the theory does not agree with the
main insights about natural numbers, and must be rejected.
Now we have to examine Russell’s statement according to which Peano had
stopped his analysis too early. It is clear that what he has in mind is the fact
Peano’s axioms can be proven with the assistance of set theory. But, from this fact
can we conclude that the domain of arithmetic is reducible to that of set theory?
From the technical considerations uncovered earlier it is possible to establish
several philosophical conclusions, and in principle none has any sort of
precedence in relation to the others until we provide some kind of justification
that explains the choice of a particular one. One possible conclusion is to infer that
set theory is committed with an ontology that includes natural numbers. Another
possible conclusion is that set theory is a very strong theory and it is this fact that






approach does not imply that numbers are sets, but that with the assistance of sets
we can simulate the structural properties of numbers; in this case the two notions
do not need to match completely. The conclusion is that technical results alone do
not establish philosophical thesis; we always need some philosophical premise
that must be sustained by appealing to general principles.
As a matter of fact Russell himself recognizes this when he says that ‘we
naturally think that the class of couples is different from the number 2’. Frege in
The Foundations of Arithmetic also draws our attention to the same problem9 :
Another type of case is, I admit, conceivable, where the extension of the concept “equal
to the concept F” might be wider or less wide that the extension of some other concept,
which the could not, on our definition, be a Number; and it is not usual to speak of a
Number as wider or less wide that the extension of a concept; but neither is there
anything to prevent us speaking in this way, if such a case should ever occur. (Frege,
1980, §69)
It is interesting to see that until today this problem has received little
attention and it is frequently considered a minor detail with no importance. Thus,
we can read in Enderton’s book on set theory:
(…)This construction of the numbers as sets involves some extraneous properties that
we did not originally expect. For example:
0 ∈ 1 ∈ 2 ∈ 3 ∈ …
and
0 ⊆ 1 ⊆ 2 ⊆ 3 ∈ …
But these properties can be regarded as accidental side effects of the definition. They do
not harm, and actually will be convenient at times. (Enderton, 1977, p. 67)
(9) It is important to realize that Frege’s conception on the nature of extension of concept is different
from the actual conception of sets.
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A possible solution to this problem would be to adopt Russell’s position as
suggested in his book Our Knowledge of External World:
(…) In comparison with this merit, the question whether the objects to which the
definition applies are like or unlike the vague ideas of numbers entertained by those
who cannot give a definition, is of very little importance. (Russell 1995, p. 210)
Here we have several problems. The first is that Russell simply assumes that
the notion of number is a definable one; but it is not so obvious that this is the case.
Some type of argumentation must be presented, and what we see is that from
Russell’s criticism of Peano’s work, nothing prevents us from treating the concept
of number as a primitive one.
Perhaps Russell’s additional thesis is that the notion of number is too elusive
whereas we have a clear understanding of the concept of set. But is this true? With
the set theoretical definition, do we have a precise definition of number? But is
this enough? Not from a philosophical point of view. If the number 2 is an elusive
entity, what do we say about the empty set? It is surprising that a philosopher like
Russell who knows the philosophical problems related to set theory very well as-
sumes such a position. What is a set? And what to say about singletons? By the
way, what are sets according to Russell’s conceptions? In chapter XVII of
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy after some considerations that pretend to
show that sets are neither individuals nor propositional functions he says:
When we have decided that classes cannot be things of the same sort as their members,
that they cannot be just heap or aggregates, and also that they cannot be identified with
propositional functions, it becomes very difficult to see what they can be, if they are to be
more that symbolic fictions (Russell 1985 p. 184).
Russell’s position is like that of a physicist, who after verifying that light’s






does not exist!10  Problems like these show that in order to obtain an ontological
reduction of arithmetic to set theory we need, in addition to technical results,
some kind of explanation that shows the intelligibility of this maneuver.
At several occasions Russell made use of Ockham’s razor11  in order to
justify his approach, and later Quine will assume a similar attitude in relation to
numbers and sets: if one type of entities is sufficient to get all we need, why assu-
me another one? To presuppose both entities would be a violation of the principle
of parsimony. However, we must be careful in using Ockham’s razor, otherwise we
can end up with a very economical system that explains nothing. A good example
of this is provided by Quine in his paper “Things and Their Place in Theories”
where he argues that we must abandon physical objects in favor of pure space-
time, and that in the sequence, we can substitute space-time for quadruples of
numbers according with a system of coordinates. In this way all we need in our
ontology is the hierarchy of pure sets:
(…) There are no longer any physical objects to serve as individuals at the base of the
hierarchy of classes, but there is no harm in that. It is a common practice in set theory
nowadays to start merely with the null class, form its unit class, and so on, thus
generating an infinite lot of classes, from which all luxuriance of infinites can be
generated. (Quine, 1981, pp. 17-18)
What does this argument prove? Nothing. We need some kind of conceptual
explanation that gives some intelligibility to this reduction, and to appeal to
(10) Here we have a very interesting situation. It is a well known fact that light has a dual nature, in
other words, at the level of quantum mechanics we only will obtain a satisfactory account of most of
central facts about it if we assume its dual character, namely, that it is neither particle nor wave but
both. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to find a physicist that from this fact concludes that light is
a ‘logical fiction’ or that quantum theory is inconsistent and must be abandoned. Why not treat set
theory in a similar way?
(11) The more common formulation of this principle is: entities should not be multiplied beyond
necessity.
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Ockham’s razor is not enough. It is difficult to imagine a philosopher or a physicist
who would be satisfied with this approach in relation to the question of what
there is. This kind of wild reduction accomplishes only one task, which is to
create a huge confusion in relation to the philosophical role of set theory.
The second problem Russell raises is that those opposed to the set
theoretical approach only have ‘vague ideas’ about numbers. These ideas can be
vague but they exist and are the main source from where any characterization of
arithmetic must start. Of course, it can happen that in developing our basic
arithmetical intuitions, we have to revise some of these ideas, what is difficult to
understand is the proposal that the intuitive notion of number is useless. Later,
Skolem will be astonished when he discovers non-standard models of
arithmetic12 . This is a good example of problems that we get in when we forget
the basic intuitions with which we start our study of arithmetic13 .
At some points Russell seems to suggest that the difficulty to find a
definition of the concept of number is an evidence in favor of the set theoretical
approach. However, from the fact that we cannot find a satisfactory definition of
numbers we can simply conclude that this concept is a primitive one. By the way,
the fact that it is hard to explain a concept does not mean that it does not exist14 :
The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s, must be beautiful; the
ideas, like colors or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first
test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics (…) It may be very
(12) Of course, that the existence of these models are an immediate consequence of the
incompleteness of arithmetic established by Gödel in 1931. However, it was Skolem that for the first
time constructed such a model.
(13) Kripke is absolutely right when he affirms: ‘(...) Certainly the philosopher of ‘possible worlds’ must
take care that his technical apparatus not push him to ask questions whose meaningfulness is not
supported by our original intuitions of possibility that gave the apparatus its point” (Kripke, p. 18)
(14) See, for instance, what happens with colors, they are indefinable but nobody will deny their






hard to define mathematical beauty, but that is just as true of beauty of any kind – we
may not know quite what we mean by a beautiful poem, but that does not prevent us
from recognizing one when we read it. (Hardy, p. 368, 1990)
After all, what are the conclusions that can be established from the analysis
of Russell’s criticism of Peano’s work? The first one is that mathematical results
are not enough when the problem is to give a satisfactory answer to an ontological
question. Russell, in some way, tries to provide these additional assumptions by
appealing, basically, to three theses, and it is from them that we must obtain our
last conclusions. The principles he adopts are the Ockham’s razor, the idea that
number are elusive entities, and that the concept of set is not difficult to define.
There are a lot of problems associated with Ockham’s razor. How must we
understand this principle? What is its exact formulation15 ? When we say that
entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity, what exactly we mean? The
answer to this will dependent on the meaning of the word ‘necessity’. Necessity
for what? If our problem is to get an intelligible ontological reduction, the need of
some conceptual explanation is a necessary condition in order to justify this
maneuver. In this sense Russell’s use of Ockham’s razor is not acceptable. In any
way, the application of this principal involves difficult problems that have been
discussed16 , and it must be used very carefully.
The problem with the idea that we will obtain a satisfactory characterization of
the natural numbers identifying them with sets is that there are other approaches to
the concept of number that seem to do justice in a more appropriate way to our
intuitions about numbers. The basic idea is that numbers different from set have
instances, and in this way is very natural to conceive them as properties. In a
passage from Mathematical Logic, Quine expresses this idea very well:
(15) See the conclusion of Burgess and Rosen’s book, for instance.
(16) See, for instance, Chateaubriand’s paper “Ockham’s Razor”.
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To say that the Apostles are pious is to attribute a property to each man among the
Apostles; and to say that we are unfortunate is to attribute a property to each individual
among us. To say that the Apostles are twelve, on the other hand, is to attribute a
property rather to the class of Apostles; and to say that we are seven is to attribute a
property to us as a class. These properties twelve and seven, symbolically, 12 and 7, are
properties of classes; or, in keeping with our custom of treating properties as classes (§
22), they maybe construed as classes of classes (…); Quine (Mathematical Logic), p. 237.
The problem is that Quine reduces properties to sets, but there are certain
approaches that do not take this step. Indeed, Russell himself considers this
possibility in his book Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy:
(…) It would be possible, though less simple than the procedure we adopt, to regard the
number of a collection as a predicate of the collection (…)(Russell 1985 p. 44).
Carnap in Meaning and Necessity17  and in Introduction to Symbolic Logic
developed this idea in some detail. For instance, in this last book in chapter A §17
Carnap defines numbers as properties. First he defines some auxiliary predicates
in the following way: 1m(F) ≡ ∃xFx; 2m(F) ≡ ∃x∃y(Fx ∧ Fy ∧ x ≠ y); 3m(F) ≡
∃x∃y∃z(Fx ∧ Fy Fz ∧ x ≠ y ∧ x ≠ z ∧ y ≠ z); etc. The next move is to use these
predicates in order to define natural number: 0(F) ≡ ¬1m(F); 1(F) ≡ 1m(F) ∧
¬2m(F); 2(F) ≡ 2m(F) ∧ ¬3m(F); and so on
18 . Of course two important problems
(17) Chapter III §27.
(18) Of course, someone can object that the concept of number is indefinable and that this type of
characterization does not do justice to it. The problem here is to determine what kind the definition is
used and how it helps us to clarify some problems related to the ontology of arithmetic. The fact that
a concept is primitive does not mean that we cannot give some kind of explanation of it. One of the
reasons that we have advanced so little in the understanding of the concept of set seems to be that
many people think that since set is an indefinable notion we must give up all our hope of obtaining a






remain: are they extensional or intensional entities? Numbers as properties apply
to sets or to other concepts? In any case, what is important here is to perceive that
we can present numbers as entities that are not sets.
In relation to the concept of set, what we have seen is a huge difficulty in
obtaining a minimal explanation of its nature. As we said before, some
elementary notions like empty set, singleton, etc. until today have not been properly
understood, and some central problems like the continuum hypothesis remains
without solution. Hence, the thesis that sets are more intelligible than numbers is
untenable. Therefore, the most reasonable approach is to assume that sets and
numbers are different types of entities that have a close relationship, and see the
set theoretical characterization of numbers as a useful tool that can help us to
understand the real meaning of the central concepts of arithmetic.
Revisão de: Ethel Menezes Rocha
RESUMO
Meu objetivo nesse artigo é examinar a preocupação de Russell com a justificação filosófica da caracterização da
aritmética pela teoria dos conjuntos como é apresentada em sua argumentação nos primeiros capítulos de seu livro
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Através desse exame procurarei responder as seguintes questões:
quais os argumentos que Russell usa para justificar sua concepção de que números são conjuntos? São bons
argumentos?  Do ponto de vista conceitual qual é o ganho que se tem a partir dessa concepção?
Palavras chave: Russell - teoria do conjunto - números
much harm in areas like arithmetic and set theory which are very general and deal with some of the
most basic notions of our conceptual framework.
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My main purpose in this article is to examine Russell’s concerns with the philosophical justification of the set
theoretical characterization of arithmetic presented in his argumentation in the first chapters of his book
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.  Through this exam I will seek to answer the following questions:
what argumentation does Russell use in order to justify his conception that numbers are sets? Is it sound? What
do we attain, from a conceptual point of view, from this approach?
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